＜＜＜「@」を「__AT__」に置き換えています＞＞＞

From: Tetsuo Hatsuda
To: "sg-l__AT__yukawa.kyoto-u.ac.jp" , ml-np 
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 12:15:12 +0000
Subject: [Sg-l:7184] 理研数理創造プログラムコロキューム：The Epidemiology and Economics of Physical Distancing during Infectious Disease Outbreaks

皆様

直前ですが、12.14(水）午前11:00から下記の理研iTHEMSコロキュームを開催します。
https://ithems.riken.jp/ja/events/the-epidemiology-and-economics-of-physical-distancing-during-infectious-disease-outbreaks

素粒子・原子核分野とは異なりますが、
 Prof. Troy Day (Professor, Head of Department,  Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Queen's University, Canada)
による”感染症発生時の物理的距離に関する疫学・経済学の数理解析”
という興味深い内容ですので投稿させて頂きます。
興味のあるかたにお気軽にご参加ください。

理研数理創造プログラム
初田哲男
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The Epidemiology and Economics of Physical Distancing during Infectious Disease Outbreaks

 Date
December 14 (Wed) at 11:00 - 12:30, 2022 (JST)
 TOMORROW
 Speaker

  *   Prof. Troy Day   (Professor, Head of Department, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Queen's University, Canada)

 Venue

  *   via Zoom

 Register

  *   Zoom registration form 

 Language
English

People's incentives during an infectious disease outbreak influence their behaviour, and this behaviour can impact how the outbreak unfolds. Early on during an outbreak, people are at little personal risk of infection and hence may be unwilling to change their lifestyle to slow the spread of disease. As the number of cases grows, however, people may then voluntarily take extreme measures to limit their exposure. Political leaders also respond to the welfare and changing desires of their constituents, through public health policies that themselves shape the course of the epidemic and its ultimate health and economic repercussions. In this talk I will use ideas from the study of differential games to model how individuals’ and politicians’ incentives change during an outbreak, and the epidemiological and economic consequences that ensue when these incentives are acted upon. Motivated by the COVID-19 pandemic, I focus on physical distancing behaviour and the imposition of stay-at-home orders by politicians. I show that there is a fundamental difference in the political, economic, and health consequences of an infectious disease outbreak depending on the degree of asymptomatic transmission. If transmission occurs primarily by asymptomatic carriers, then politicians will be incentivized to impose stay-at-home orders earlier and for longer than individuals would like. Despite such orders being unpopular, however, they ultimately benefit all individuals. On the other hand, if the disease is transmitted primarily by symptomatic infections, then individuals are incentivized to stay at home earlier and for longer than politicians would like. In this case, politicians will be incentivized to impose back-to-work orders that, despite being unpopular, will again ultimately be to the benefit of all individuals.
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